In labor injunction cases, courts of equity prior to the 1930s often abused their powers by issuing blanket decrees prohibiting picketing and union organizing. A minority of appellate courts held, however, that blanket injunctions were "too broad," 9 relying on traditional maxims of equity 0 to develop a doctrine regarding the proper breadth of labor injunctions. These courts ruled that a decree was "too broad" if it reached beyond unlawful acts and swept within its ambit "lawful persuasion"" or "publication"' 2 of information about a labor dispute. A significant aspect of this analysis was that courts permitted defendants to challenge the potential breadth of injunctions that would reach peaceful "persuasion" even if the defendants' own conduct had been unlawful and properly enjoinable. 3 In the crucible of the Great Depression and New Deal, courts increasingly began to recognize labor's right to organize as an important free speech issue,' 4 engrafting constitutional analysis onto the extant overbreadth doctrinal structure in labor injunction cases. 15 As labor decrees became more limited, and as employers began to rely on equally expansive picketing statutes, 16 state high courts used the overbreadth approach of equity to invalidate such statutes 8. See 11. Plant, 57 N.E. at 1015. 12. Pierce, 103 P. at 328. 13. See, e.g., Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 F. 45,49-52 (7th Cir. 1908) (narrowing broad injunction to protect right of "persuasion" in labor dispute even though defendants had committed acts of violence); Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' Int'l Union, 193 N.E. 112, 121 (Ill. 1934) ("The mere fact that acts of violence had been previously committed would of itself furnish no justification for enjoining legal acts of peaceable persuasion."); Plant, 57 N.E. at 1015 (modifying injunction to protect "lawful persuasion" even though defendant's strike for closed shop was deemed unlawful). Courts allowed defendants to challenge the potential scope of injunctions even if defendants' conduct had been unlawful because "an injunction does not issue.., as punishment for the past." Nann v. Raimist 16. See Note, Constitutionality of Anti-Picketing Ordinances, 48 YALE L.J. 308, 308-09 (1938) (explaining that employers increasingly relied on broad picketing ordinances in wake of increasing unavailability of broad injunctions); Eugene T. Kinder, Comment, 39 MICH. L. REv. 110, 112 (1940) . under the First Amendment. 7 These opinions served as important precedents at the time the Court decided Thornhill, and their influence was evident in the Court's enunciation of the free speech overbreadth doctrine. Drawing from the approach at equity, the Court in Thornhill held that a picketing statute that was so broad as to restrict protected speech was unconstitutional, and that the defendant could challenge such a broad prohibition on its face regardless of whether his own conduct was not privileged.' s Part I of this Note traces the emergence of overbreadth analysis in the regulation of labor at equity, analyzing the rise of broad labor injunctions and judicial and legislative efforts to restrict them under the traditional principles of equity. Part II examines the constitutionalization of the overbreadth doctrine under the First Amendment in injunction cases, in state court statutory cases, and finally in the landmark case of Thornhill v. Alabama.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS IN THE REGULATION OF LABOR AT EQUITY

A. The Ascendancy of the Labor Injunction and the Abuse of Equity
The rise of the injunction as the principal tool for regulating labor catalyzed the development of overbreadth analysis at equity. Prior to the 1880s, the primary means of regulating labor disputes in the United States had been criminal prosecution under the common law doctrine of conspiracy. 9 In the late 1800s, however, the labor injunction supplanted criminal conspiracy trials, 20 largely as a result of employers' responses to changes in labor organizing tactics. 2 ' The local strike by informal groups of workers gave way to far-reaching strikes organized by unions that often coordinated activity across cities, regions, and even the entire nation. 22 Employers found that these new strategies were difficult to combat with conspiracy trials, which moved slowly and could affect only a limited number of people and range of activities. 2 3 The injunction, which did not require jury trials and could reach a wider range of people in speedier fashion, 24 controlling the new coordinated strike strategies and hence became employers' preferred remedy.2 In order to seek injunctive relief, employers had to bring suit at equity rather than at law. Under traditional conceptions, equity served as a supplement to the law, providing a remedy in the interests of justice and fairness where no adequate relief at law was available. 26 The typical remedy at equity was the injunction, or judicial decree, whereas the remedies available at law were damages or criminal prosecution. In requesting equitable relief, employers argued that the available legal remedies of damages or prosecution were inadequate because it would be impracticable to file a multiplicity of actions to redress a far-reaching labor conspiracy. 27 The first equitable decrees against far-flung strikes were issued in railway labor cases in the late 1870s and 1880s, 2 ' although the precise date of the first labor injunction is unknown. 29 Courts issued sweeping decrees to crush the national railroad strike of 187730 and the Pullman Strike of 1894. 31 Observing the expansive potential of this new weapon against labor organizing, employers and manufacturers' associations eagerly sought injunctions in labor disputes outside the railway context and in smaller-scale disputes as well. 2 Employers faced with strikes or other union activity increasingly went to judges, at times even judges who were not officially sitting, and alleged by affidavit that a labor conspiracy would do irreparable damage to their property unless restrained by court order. 3 Judges usually granted requests for broad preliminary injunctions forbidding union activity and later issued formal injunctions after bench trials between the parties. 686-91 (1930) . In federal courts, employers relied largely on the Sherman Antitrust Act under a theory of conspiracy in restraint of trade. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 5, at 8-9.
34. GREGORY, supra note 6, at 100.
The scope of these formal injunctions was often expansive with respect to both the number of people and the types of activities covered. 35 The injunction issued against Eugene Debs and the Pullman railroad strikers in 1894, for example, ordered the defendants "and all persons combining and conspiring with them, and all other persons whomsoever, absolutely to desist ... from... in any way or manner interfering with... the business of any of the following named railroads. 36 Such a broad injunction put a large number of people at risk of contempt of court for engaging in peaceful efforts to persuade other workers to desist from work. In describing the problem of broad injunctions in 1915, Edwin Witte, a prominent contemporary commentator, 37 reported that "blanket clauses prohibiting interference in any manner with the business or property of complainants have occurred in probably more than one-half of all injunctions which have been issued in connection with labor disputes. 38 The broad reach of labor injunctions gave rise to the slogan "government by injunction, 39 which reflected the growing discontent with the unbounded power of the equity courts in labor disputes.
In issuing these injunctions, courts abused the traditional principles of equity that customarily had limited the scope of injunctive powers. 40 One of the central principles that the labor injunction courts overlooked was the tenet that equity courts should tailor their decrees to the substantive law on the matter at hand. 4 ' This principle is embodied in the maxim, aequitas sequitur legem, which means "equity follows the law." 42 39. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 5, at 1. 40. See FORBATH, supra note 8, at 62 ("Courts cast aside customary limits on the purpose and scope of injunctions to accommodate the injunction's new role as a mode of lawmaking and law enforcement in industrial cities and regions."); GREGORY, supra note 6, at 98 ("And they completely ignored the policy behind the traditions of equity, which left people free from personal interference at the hands of the court, except in very special cases of unreasonably precipitated threatened harm to tangible property.").
By asserting jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes, courts generally contravened the principle of nineteenth-century doctrine that equity may only intervene to protect against damage to tangible property. See FORBATH, supra note 8, at 81-82, 85. By treating an employer's expectation of the continued services of his employees as property, Witte, supra note 19, at 834, the courts relied on a rather expansive definition of property that conflicted with the prevailing view of nineteenth-century equity jurisprudence that property consisted of dominion over objects, see FORBATH, supra note 8, at 81, 85. The courts' abstract definition of property in injunction cases gained greater legitimacy, however, in the decades following the first uses of the labor injunction as the rise of laissez-faire economics expanded the concept of property to include "the right to do business and [ [Vol. 105: 1671 when they issued blanket decrees without heed to the substantive law of labor conspiracies, which contained modest protections for labor activity. 43 Courts in labor injunction cases contravened, moreover, the traditional principle of equity that courts may only issue a decree to prevent irreparable injury that has been clearly proven likely to occur." Courts violated this requirement by issuing injunctions against a wide range of actions that had not been pleaded or proven likely to transpire. In addition, by issuing decrees against virtually all the world, the courts violated the principle that equity should not interfere with the rights of innocent parties or third parties not privy to the suit. 4 5
B. The Emergence of a Doctrine Against Broad Labor Injunctions
As blanket injunctions proliferated, some of the more prudent state appellate courts 46 began to hand down decisions criticizing the broad scope of labor injunctions under the traditional principles of equity jurisprudence. One of the central maxims that undergirded these decisions was aequitas sequitur legem, which prompted some appeals courts to limit lower court injunctions to the ambit warranted by the common law of labor conspiracy. 47 Since the 1840s, the common law in the United States had held that labor organizing did not constitute unlawful conspiracy if both the means and the ends of the activity were legitimate. a Over time, courts had developed 43. See Witte, supra note 19, at 828 (explaining that, under conspiracy doctrine, legality of labor combination depended on purposes sought to be accomplished and means used to effect that purpose); infra text accompanying notes 48-53.
44. See 1 HIGH, supra note 10, § 22. 45. See id. § 33 ("So an injunction does not affect the rights of third parties which have been acquired in good faith when they are not parties or privies to the suit."); see also GREGORY, supra note 6, at 101 ("Anyone violating the broad and comprehensive terms of such injunctions was punished for contempt, whether or not he had been served as.a party in the suit.").
46. See GREGORY, supra note 6, at 103 ("A few of the highest state courts ... were also careful in the way they used their power to issue injunctions whenever they exercised it." (Holmes, J., dissenting). According to Holmes, such justification depended on whether the ends and means of the labor activity were legitimate in light of public policy concerns. See Plant, 57 N.E. at 1016 (Holmes, C.J., dissenting); Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1080-81 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 5, at 24-25 (explaining Holmes's theory). criteria for identifying legitimate or "justifiable" means and ends. The means of labor activity were deemed legitimate if they fell within relatively narrow constraints of socially acceptable behavior and did not pose a threat of physical injury or undue economic harm. 49 Courts characteristically distinguished, for example, between legitimate "persuasion" and unacceptable "intimidation." 50 This distinction was malleable, 5 ' leading to varying levels of protection for picketing and organizing in different jurisdictions. 52 As for labor's ends, courts found them to be legitimate if they fell within the immediate range of workers' economic self-interest and did not interfere with an employer's freedom of contract. 5 3 In following the law, a small number of equity courts at the turn of the century, particularly state appellate courts 54 of California, 55 Massachusetts, 56 and New York, 57 began to hold that injunctions were "too broad" if they prohibited labor activity with legitimate means and ends. 58 Although these decisions varied in their degree of substantive protection, 59 with some providing only nominal protection, 6 they were significant because they established an overbreadth form of analysis. A notable example of the emerging overbreadth doctrine was the opinion of the California Supreme Court in Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 61 handed down in 1909. The court held that a labor injunction that restrained members of a union from "'in any wise interfering with' plaintiff's business" was "broader in its terms than the law warrants., 62 The court explained that the injunction was "too broad" because it reached "reasonable persuasion," "publication," and "secondary boycott[s]," which were "legal" means for achieving the union's objectives. 63 (Cal. 1906 ) (finding an injunction to be "too comprehensive" because some parts "seem to enjoin appellants from the mere expression of an opinion").
62. Pierce, 103 P. at 328. 63. Id. at 328-29. The court's analysis was characteristic of some of the early overbreadth decisions because the court focused on protecting means of communication that the union might use, such as "persuasion" and "publication," without explicitly linking those means to a range of possible ends that did not, however, protect picketing, which it found to be an unlawful means. 64 Thus, the court applied overbreadth analysis to tailor the decree to the scope warranted by the substantive law.
Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Plant v. Woods 65 held that a lower court decree restraining a decorators' union from striking for a closed shop was "too broad and indefinite, inasmuch as it might seem to include mere lawful persuasion and other similar and peaceful acts., 66 Thus, the court found the injunction to be overly broad because it might cover lawful labor activity. In Mills v. United States Printing Co.,67 moreover, a New York court held that an injunction against picketing and organizing a strike was drafted "in terms too broad" because it would forbid efforts to organize a strike to seek better working conditions, which was an instance of lawful activity undertaken for a lawful purpose. 6 8 Thus, these courts found injunctions to be "too broad" because they prohibited legitimate organizing activity without regard for the substantive law of labor disputes.
In addition, the emerging doctrine against broad injunctions was not predicated exclusively on the notion that equity should follow the substantive law. Concern for traditional principles of equity also led some courts to refuse to prohibit offenses that had not been proven likely to come about. In 1907, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reasoned, for example, that unlawful conduct that had not been "pleaded and proved" could not properly be enjoined with a blanket injunction against "any interference in the future" with the plaintiff's business. 9 Courts also found some injunctions to be too expansive because they violated the principle that equity should not enjoin the conduct of innocent parties; in these cases, courts modified broad injunctions to protect the rights of parties who had not engaged in unlawful conduct. 70 A salient aspect of the emerging overbreadth jurisprudence was that courts allowed parties to challenge the prospective scope of injunctions even if their would be permissible. Perhaps due to a reluctance to legitimize a variety of ends of union organizing, the court simply implied that the means it was protecting would be used for lawful ends. I]t would be a gross injustice to attach to persons who have not been shown to be participants in these transactions the stigma of an injunction."); FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 5, at 124 n.163 (citing cases for which "[i]njunctions have been dissolved as to innocent parties defendant"). own conduct had been unlawful. 7 1 Regardless of whether the party challenging an injunction had engaged in unlawful conduct such as intimidation or even violence, the courts eliminated portions of injunctions that could conceivably restrict efforts at peaceful persuasion by that party or unnamed parties in the future. 2 This jurisprudence stemmed from equity's concern for restricting the prospective impact of injunctions on the rights of the parties before the court as well as on third parties. I shall argue that this strain of jurisprudence later influenced the Supreme Court in creating the free speech overbreadth exception to the constitutional standing rule that parties whose own conduct is not privileged may not vindicate prospective violations of rights not currently before the court. 73 The analytic framework of the emerging overbreadth doctrine was important not only for its eventual theoretical implications for free speech jurisprudence, but also for its practical effect. The practice of striking provisions that prohibited peaceful persuasion while upholding the power of lower courts to regulate "illegitimate" means and ends allowed courts to achieve a pragmatic balance between freedom and regulation. 74 Courts found this balance to be useful for stabilizing volatile labor conflicts because it created a safety valve of expression while preserving the power of courts to ban tactics they viewed as more threatening. 75 This balance would assume even greater importance in the tumultuous 1930s.
C. The Clayton Act and Its Aftermath
Most courts in the early 1900s, however, did not adopt the emerging doctrine against broad injunctions, 76 which remained largely confined to a 71. See, e.g., Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 F. 45,49 (7th Cir. 1908) ("(S]urely men are not to be denied the right to pursue a legitimate end in a legitimate way, simply because they may have overstepped the mark and trespassed upon the rights of their adversary."). Courts that adopted the overbreadth doctrine generally permitted defendants to challenge the overly broad portions of injunctions even if most of their own conduct was unlawful. See ("Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court."); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 1124. 74. See HATrAM, supra note 8, at 162 (explaining that courts used labor injunctions to find a "middle ground" or pragmatic balance allowing labor organization to be both accepted and regulated).
75. See Dail-Overland Co. v. Willys-Overland, Inc., 263 F. 171, 189 (N.D. Ohio 1919) ("[Picketing] was ordered and allowed in this case as a convenient means of stabilizing a very uncertain situation.").
76. See Witte, supra note 38, app. B at 155 (estimating that blanket clauses were issued in more than half of all injunction cases before 1915). It is difficult to specify the exact number of cases that issued blanket injunctions since many such injunctions were unreported, see FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 5, at 91 n.40, but most sources indicate that a majority of courts abused their equity power, see, e.g., GREGORY, supra note 6, at 103-04. In addition, the task of specifying the exact scope of the problem is difficult because the leading authorities on injunctions were not impartial or above the fray with regard to 1679 1996] The Yale Law Journal minority of state appellate courts. 7 ' The problem of broad injunctions was particularly serious in the federal courts, which were typically the most hostile to labor. 78 In response to the repeated abuse of equity by federal courts, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) began to lobby for legislation to curb the power of federal equity courts in labor disputes. 79 After years of AFL lobbying, Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914.0
The key provision of the statute from labor's standpoint was § 20, which restricted the scope of injunctions in disputes between "employers and employees." 8 ' Section 20 limited injunctions by requiring federal courts to follow the traditional principle of equity that an injunction shall not be granted unless "necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property," and by insisting that the property right be described "with particularity. 82 Congress thereby sought to cure the problem of broadly phrased injunctions that were issued in the absence of proof of actual or highly probable harm. Section 20 also forbade courts to enjoin workers from "peacefully persuading" and "communicating information," and protected labor's right of "peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes. 8 3 The Act was described by one of its leading proponents, John W. Davis, as an "effort to crystallize into law the best opinions of the best courts. ' 8 4 Although this statement was motivated by salesmanship, it did embody an important element of truth. As we have seen, some courts had protected "peaceful persuasion" and had limited injunctions by requiring proof of an actual threat of harm under a nascent overbreadth doctrine at equity. Thus, the Clayton, Act represented the first instance in which Congress exerted pressure on the federal courts to adopt the emerging equitable overbreadth doctrine of labor injunction cases.
Interestingly, the debate surrounding the Clayton Act foreshadowed the link between the overbreadth doctrine at equity and constitutional principles that would become central in the 1930s. Samuel Gompers, President of the AFL, hailed the Act as labor's "Magna Carta, ''85 and some of its proponents this socially charged issue. The treatise by Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene on the labor injunction, which remains the classic work on the subject, HATrAM, supra note 8, at 161 n.123, was written largely to contribute to the lobbying effort for passage of anti-injunction legislation. See touted it as a bill of rights for labor in equitable proceedings. 8 6 This propensity to characterize a law codifying labor's rights at equity as possessing the majesty of the Magna Carta illustrates the conceptual roots of the later constitutionalization of the overbreadth doctrine of equity.
Despite labor's hopes for a new Magna Carta and the sincere efforts of Congress to limit injunctions to the best principles of equity, the federal courts remained recalcitrant. 87 The United States Supreme Court, in its first pronouncement upon the Clayton Act, declared that § 20 did not protect union members who were peacefully persuading employees of other companies not to work with machines built by their company. 88 The Court, relying on a narrow reading of the Act, reasoned that § 20 was inapplicable because a secondary boycott was not within the statutory definition of a dispute between employers and employees. With the Supreme Court's guidance, lower courts continued to issue broad injunctions against interference with business. 8 9 It is important to point out, however, that in the wake of the Clayton Act some courts did take the principles of equity more seriously. 90 Most of these tribunals were state courts, which technically were not bound by the federal Clayton Act. 9 ' Nevertheless, they continued to apply the principles of equity and to develop the overbreadth doctrine. 92 In Grassi Contracting Co. v. Bennett, for example, a New York court found that an injunction forbidding any type of strike was "altogether too broad" because it was "warranted neither by the facts nor the law." 93 The court reasoned that the injunction was too broad because it prohibited publishing "in any manner" that the plaintiff's business was being blacklisted and forbade the defendant from calling a strike ( finding that "broad sweep of restraint" of preliminary injunction was erroneous because it reached "lawful union arguments" and "lawful union speeches"); Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 159 N.E. at 869 (holding that "broad scope" of injunction was beyond power of court because reached lawful ends undertaken for lawful means). "for any reason." 94 In other words, the court held that the injunction extended beyond equitable bounds by prohibiting activity with lawful means and ends. 95 The decree was also too broad, according to the court, because the evidence did not indicate that the defendant "ha[d] threatened or intend[ed] to do any of these things. 96 The court thereby based its overbreadth holding both on analysis of means and ends and on the principle that courts of equity should issue injunctions only against actual rather than hypothetical threats of harm. Similarly, in the Southern California Iron & Steel Co. case, a California court held that an injunction was "too broad in its terms, in that it purports to prohibit acts which may or may not be unlawful, according to the purpose for which they are done." 97 Significantly, as the more liberal state courts continued to develop overbreadth analysis, their rationale acquired new subtleties in some cases. In International Pocket Book Workers' Union v. Orlove, 98 for example, a Maryland court observed that "in so far as the injunctions may be so broad that their meaning and content depend upon the unpredictable views of the court in particular applications, they may operate as mere screens for subsequent ex post facto ... punishments." 99 The court thereby expressed concern over arbitrary enforcement of broad injunctions, noting that the possibility of such enforcement would make it difficult for defendants to know when their conduct was lawful. Hence, the enjoined parties' only viable course of conduct would be "abandonment of all picketing and other efforts; and that.., cannot be required."' 1 This concern that the possibility of arbitrary enforcement of broad prohibitions might deter prospective exercise of picketing rights reappeared later in the Supreme Court's free speech overbreadth jurisprudence.' Some courts also continued to develop the principle that injunctions could be found to be too broad because they prohibited lawful activity even if the defendant's own action had been unlawful. 2 The rationale some courts developed, as stated by Judge Cardozo, was that "[a]n injunction does not issue in such circumstances as punishment for the past. Its only legitimate end is protection for the future."' 0 3 Since an injunction was a purely prospective remedy, some liberal appellate courts held that its proper scope should be evaluated not on the basis of past action, but rather on the basis of ongoing or threatened future conduct.' Hence, a New York court noted that a blanket injunction against picketing may be too "broad" despite allegations of past unlawful acts.1 0 5 In this manner, the courts continued to elaborate the view that prohibitions against picketing and persuasion could be held to be too broad even if some of the defendant's past conduct was proscribable.
Although the Supreme Court generally viewed labor activity unfavorably in this era, in the 1920s the Court began to apply a version of the overbreadth analysis that had emerged in the liberal lower courts. In American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council,"e 6 the Court eliminated from the injunction at issue the word "persuasion" as it applied to two of the defendants, on the grounds that persuasion was a "lawful" form of labor activity.' 0 7 The Court expressed reservations about permitting picketing, however, and allowed only one picket at each factory gate.' Although this holding provided only limited protection for picketing, the Court showed signs of embracing the emerging overbreadth approach.
D. The ACLU and the Continued Push to Codify the Traditional Practices of Equity
The persistent tendency of lower federal courts to issue broad injunctions,"° with only a few exceptions," 0 became one of the central concerns of the community of civil liberties advocates in the 1920s."1 Although most courts continued to refuse to recognize picketing and labor organizing as implicating free speech rights," 2 civil liberties activists began to view restrictions at equity on labor's speech as significant infringements of First Amendment liberties. In particular, labor's efforts at opposing blanket injunctions drew the attention of Roger Baldwin, a prominent free speech activist."' In late 1919 and early 1920, Baldwin argued for reorganizing the National Civil Liberties Bureau, a leading free speech organization, declaring that "'the cause we now serve is labor.""' 4 At Baldwin's urging, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was founded in 1920, and one of its principal missions was to defend labor's rights against judicial incursion."5
In late 1920, Baldwin convened a national conference on the problem of the labor injunction, admitting that the ACLU was uncertain about how to address the problem in light of continuing judicial hostility." 6 Felix Frankfurter, the nation's leading expert on labor injunctions, recommended a legislative solution and outlined a possible lobbying effort for a federal statute to restrict the scope of injunctions." 7 The ACLU, together with the AFL, began lobbying for this legislation in 1925 and persuaded Congress to hold hearings two years later." 8 By 1930, Roger Baldwin took charge of the campaign, forming the National Committee on Labor Injunctions to carry it out." 9 The efforts of Baldwin and the ACLU paid off in 1932 when Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 20 The Act was designed to place more specific and comprehensive restrictions on the power of federal courts of equity in labor disputes than those of the largely ineffectual Clayton Act.' 2 ' In limiting the range of equitable powers, 22 Congress was especially intent on protecting the rights of workers to give publicity to the facts of disputes, "whether by advertising, speaking, [or] patrolling."' 23 Congress limited the scope of injunctions by requiring that they be based on "findings of fact" and confined to the "specific act or acts as may be expressly complained of."' 24 Furthermore, the statute restricted injunctions to acts that "will be committed unless restrained."'12 Congress thereby drafted the statute to limit injunctions to actual rather than hypothetical harms and to ensure that they would be clear and precise. In this manner, the Act codified the restrictive doctrines of equity that a minority of courts had developed and observed. As one contemporary 113 commentator noted, "it is safe to say that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did little more than codify the attitude of the more liberal courts."' 2 6 In the wake of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, seventeen states adopted laws that likewise sought to codify the restrictive equity doctrines that formed the core of overbreadth analysis. 7 The passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and its state analogues marked a turning point in the development of the overbreadth doctrine. Norris-LaGuardia reflected the mounting public support for restricting the broad prohibitions that courts had placed on labor's rights to organize and advocate. 28 This support was particularly strong in the early 1930s due to the dire economic downturn of the Great Depression. Norris-LaGuardia and its analogues served as clear legislative endorsements of the liberal courts that had taken an expansive view of the legitimate means and ends of expression in labor disputes. Thus, Norris-LaGuardia was largely effective in curbing the issuance of broad injunctions by federal courts.' 29 The state law counterparts also helped limit broad injunctions, although some courts in jurisdictions without such statutes or with inadequate statutes continued to abuse their equity power. 30 The legislative debates surrounding the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act evinced free speech overtones. One Representative expressed his support, for example, for the free speech rights of members of labor unions: "If the Constitution means anything in the matter of freedom of speech, it should be applied just as fully to men who belong to a union .... ',,ls Thus, the Act, which marked the triumph of the equitable principles underlying the overbreadth doctrine, was also bound up with an emphasis on free speech that reflected the goals of its proponents and lobbyists.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS
The history of the Norris-LaGuardia Act indicates that the growing support for traditional principles of equity in the 1930s was linked to an increasing emphasis on freedom of speech. As labor gained political strength and public approval during the Great Depression and New Deal, it began to win not only congressional but also judicial recognition of its picketing and organizing activities as exercises of free speech. 32 Thus, courts began to introduce free speech principles into the emerging equity jurisprudence, 33 taking an important initial step toward the constitutionalization of the overbreadth doctrine that occurred at the end of the decade.
A. The Influence of Free Speech Principles in Labor Injunction Cases
The growing recognition of labor's speech rights among courts of equity in the 1930s stemmed both from labor's enhanced political clout' 34 and from its increasingly political message. 35 Throughout the decade, labor played a central role in national politics, pressing Congress to pass such momentous legislation as the Wagner Act 36 and the Fair Labor Standards Act. 137 Labor activism also became increasingly politicized, or politically charged, as labor became the backbone of the New Deal coalition 38 and as some sectors of the labor movement became more involved with radical politics.' 39 These political overtones led some courts in labor injunction cases to reconceive of labor's picketing and protesting as activities central to democracy rather than vulgar instances of intimidation or economic coercion. 40 Another factor prompting some courts to consider free speech principles in labor injunction cases was the general rise in -the prestige of free speech in the 1930s. Support for free speech increased in the United States partly because Nazi and Bolshevik repression in Europe stimulated sentiments in favor of greater protection for liberty at home.' 4 143 In that opinion, the Court upheld a Wisconsin anti-injunction act that protected peaceful picketing, rejecting a claim that the act violated the Due Process Clause. 144 Justice Brandeis noted that "members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a State, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. 1 4 Since this was the first instance in which the Court hinted that it considered picketing to be a form of free speech, 146 the Brandeis dictum exerted significant influence on lower courts. 147 Despite its role in encouraging courts to apply free speech principles in labor cases, the Senn dictum did not provide much doctrinal guidance as to the parameters of free speech protection of labor activity. 48 In its brevity, the Brandeis dictum left many questions unanswered. 4 9 In the absence of clear guidance, courts in labor cases turned to the doctrinal structure that already existed at equity for protecting labor's rights of picketing and persuasion, engrafting their discussion of free speech onto the preexisting analytical structure of equity. 5 In the process, the discussion of free speech often strengthened the protections that had emerged at equity. Some courts in the 1930s used the overbreadth analysis typical of equity cases as a doctrinal framework to perform both free speech analysis and No. 3,152 for example, the California Supreme Court invalidated a decree against picketing and distributing leaflets for the following reasons:
[The decree is] too broad, for the reason that, not only do the terms thereof go so far as to infringe upon the constitutional right to freely circulate and offer said newspaper ... but [also] ... the comprehensive terms of the injunction herein enjoin appellants from doing some of the acts ... it may lawfully do in furtherance of a secondary boycott. 53 The court thus invalidated an injunction as "too broad" on the dual grounds that it violated free speech rights and reached lawful activity undertaken for legitimate ends. The court thereby utilized the overbreadth approach from equity as a single doctrinal umbrella for carrying out both free speech analysis and the means and ends inquiry of equity jurisprudence.
Sometimes courts synthesized the overbreadth approach of equity with free speech principles, moreover, by finding injunctions to be too broad in violation of free speech rights if they did not withstand the analysis of means and ends. For example, in Ex parte Lyons 54 , a 1938 California Court of Appeal decision, the court held that an injunction violated the free speech guarantee because it proscribed lawful picketing activity undertaken for lawful ends. The court explained that peaceful picketing was legitimate under the statutory and decisional law of California, and that furtherance of a secondary boycott was a lawful objective. Thus, the court held that "a secondary boycott peacefully and properly conducted is legal in California under the constitutional guaranty of the right of free speech."' 55 In reaching this conclusion, the court cited the overbreadth analysis of Lisse v. Local Union No. 31156 and Southern California Iron & Steel Co., 5 7 which had been central in establishing overbreadth analysis at equity. The court found that the injunction in question, like the decrees in the earlier cases, was "too broad" because it forbade peaceful picketing in violation of free speech principles. 5 8 In a number of labor injunction cases of the 1930s, the courts applied overbreadth analysis in tandem with free speech principles, allowing for overlap and synthesis. Although the doctrinal link was not uniform in its 151. See Berman, supra note 132, at 317 (noting that in some instances scope of labor's rights and free speech issues were "decided under a single doctrinal framework" [Vol. 105: 1671 development, the labor injunction cases stamped overbreadth analysis with a constitutional imprimatur that would contribute to its incorporation into First Amendment doctrine in statutory cases.
B. The Extension of Overbreadth Analysis to Statutes Under the First Amendment
As a result of the increasing limitations placed on labor injunctions in the 1930s, many employers sought to regulate labor activity in a different manner by urging states and municipalities to pass regulatory ordinances or to apply existing statutes. A pair of commentators, writing in 1938 and 1940, noted that employers had begun to rely on municipal and state picketing statutes as substitutes for the increasingly limited labor injunction.' 59 These statutes placed restrictions on picketing that were similar in scope to the broad injunctions they replaced. For example, a section of the Reno, Nevada, picketing ordinance imposed fines or imprisonment on "'whoever shall watch, beset or picket the premises of another, or any approach thereto for the purpose of inducing others to refrain from entering such premises. ' ' 6 0 According to one commentator, these statutes were often broad enough in scope to bring about the "complete nullification" of the gains labor had made in limiting injunctions. t
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The role of picketing statutes as substitutes for blanket injunctions led some state courts to rely on past labor injunction cases in invalidating local and state picketing statutes under the First Amendment. In 1939, two state supreme courts handed down opinions that extended the overbreadth doctrinal approach from equity to picketing statutes under the First Amendment.' 62 These courts invalidated the ordinances under the Free Speech Clause on the grounds that they reached too far in prohibiting even peaceful picketing with a lawful purpose. In this manner, the courts helped to convert the overbreadth approach that had been developed at equity into a First Amendment doctrine in statutory cases.
The clearest example was the opinion of the Supreme Court of Nevada in City of Reno v. Second Judicial District Court. 63 In that case, the court facially invalidated two sections of Reno's picketing ordinance on the ground that they violated the First Amendment.' 64 164. The two sections of the Reno ordinance that the court invalidated imposed a blanket ban on picketing. See Reno, 95 P.2d at 996 (quoting § 2 of Reno picketing ordinance); id. (quoting § 4 to the effect that, "'Whoever, in association or agreement with one or more persons, shall assemble, congregate, quoting at length from a series of labor injunction cases that had protected "peaceful persuasion for the promotion of a lawful purpose."' 65 After emphasizing this means and ends rule, the court proceeded to hold that the sections at issue violated the First Amendment because they reached all forms of picketing regardless of the lawfulness of means and ends:
[The sections] go beyond regulation. They are a sweeping prohibition of any form of picketing, irrespective of its nature, purpose or number of pickets, and constitute an interdiction of all activities and free speech sought to be exercised in the form of peaceful picketing. The federal constitution guarantees freedom of speech. 66 The court in the Reno case invalidated the ordinance sections as violations of the free speech guarantee because they did not delimit the scope of the prohibition by taking account of either the form or the purpose of the picketing. The court thereby characterized the manner and the ends of picketing as the touchstone for establishing the proper breadth of picketing prohibitions under the First Amendment. The court held that the sections were too broad because they forbade all picketing in all forms for all ends. The court thereby used overbreadth analysis characteristic of equity as a basis for reaching its free speech decision.
The court's analysis in Reno was analogous to the approach at equity, moreover, because the court sought to strike a balance between protecting freedom and allowing regulation, acknowledging that the state may "regulate" picketing but emphasizing that it may not "prohibit" picketing altogether.' 67 Furthermore, just as courts of equity had permitted defendants who had engaged in intimidation or unlawful conduct to challenge the breadth of injunctions that reached peaceful persuasion, so too the court in Reno allowed the defendants to challenge the breadth of the provisions that reached peaceful picketing regardless of whether their own conduct was peaceful.' 6 The court stated that, in deciding the constitutional question, "the agreed statement of facts will be laid out of consideration" and that the validity of the provisions would be decided "as a matter of law."' 169 Thus, the court was not concerned with the application of the statute to the facts in the instant case but rather with the facial and prospective constitutionality of the provisions. or meet together in the vicinity of the premises of another, or upon the streets ... for the purpose of inducing others to refrain from entering such premises. The other major state court decision regarding a picketing statute in 1939 was the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in People v. Harris. 170 Like the Reno court, the court in Harris surveyed the law of numerous labor injunction cases, noting that labor has the right to engage in "peaceful picketing when done for a lawful purpose."' 171 The court proceeded to invalidate the Colorado statute as applied in the instant case on the grounds that it was an "unqualified prohibition" and that it reached "peaceful picketing" in violation of the free speech guarantee, quoting from past injunction cases, such as Ex parte Lyons, 172 that protected peaceful picketing under the First Amendment. 173 Thus, the court in Harris, like the court in Reno, drew from the analysis of means and ends characteristic of equity's overbreadth approach in rendering its free speech decision. 7 The major innovation of Reno and Harris was their extension of the basic framework for protecting picketing at equity to statutory cases under the First Amendment. This was a significant step on the path to Thornhill because the statutes in those cases were analogous to the Alabama picketing statute invalidated in Thornhill. In fact, the court in Harris noted that "[o]nly one other state, Alabama, has a similar law."' 75 In addition, the Reno court discussed and distinguished an Alabama state court opinion upholding the picketing statute that the Supreme Court would subsequently hold unconstitutional in Thornhill. 176 Thus, the decisions in Reno and Harris provided salient precedents on picketing statutes in general, and Alabama's in particular, when the Supreme Court heard arguments in Thornhill.
C. Thornhill v. Alabama: The "Fountainhead" 1 M of the Free Speech Overbreadth Doctrine
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Thornhill in February 1940.78 The Alabama statute at issue declared it a misdemeanor for any person "'without a just cause or legal excuse ' . ' 3448 (1923) ). The Court found that this qualifying phrase "does not in any effective manner restrict the breadth of the regulation; the words themselves have no ascertainable meaning either inherent or historical." Id. at 100. any lawful business."" ' 1 8 0 The law had been applied to prosecute Byron Thornhill, a union president, who had walked a picket line with six or eight other men at the plant of the Brown Wood Preserving Company in Brownsville, Alabama.' 8 ' Thornhill's offense was that he approached Clarence Simpson, a nonunion worker entering the plant, and told him that the union was on strike and that he should not report to work. 8 2
The Alabama statute, in its rhetoric and scope, was similar to blanket injunctions that prohibited unions from "congregating, picketing ... or otherwise interfering with the employees, business, or working organization of the plaintiff."' 8 3 The statute, like sweeping injunctions, left little room for peaceful picketing and persuasion. The Thornhill Court thus faced a similar set of circumstances to those that arose in the Reno and Harris cases: the application of an expansive picketing statute that was analogous to the picketing injunctions that had been used to stifle labor activity. The Reno case played a particularly important role in framing the issues of Thornhill. In his brief in Thornhill, the petitioner stated that he had decided to abbreviate his free speech argument and simply append the Reno decision as an "exhaustive citation[] of all relevant authority." 1 ' 84 The Court's analysis and rhetoric in Thornhill closely tracked that of the Reno opinion in key places. The Court found that the state picketing statute constituted a "sweeping regulation"' 8 5 that was invalid on the following grounds:
The statute ... leaves room for no exceptions based upon either the number of persons engaged in the proscribed activity, the peaceful character of their demeanor, the nature of their dispute with an employer, or the restrained character and the accurateness of the terminology used in notifying the public of the facts of the dispute.
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The Court in Thornhill found the Alabama statute to be too broad because it prohibited all picketing without regard to the "nature of [the] dispute" and the "restrained character" of the picketing, thereby anchoring its analysis of the proper breadth of the statute in a means and ends inquiry. Significantly, the Court cast this overbreadth analysis explicitly in free speech terms at another point in the opinion, finding the statute to be too broad because in reaching peaceful picketing the statute interfered with protected speech: sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech .. . .""' Thus, the Court applied an overbreadth framework analogous to that of Reno and prior equity cases in developing its free speech approach. The Supreme Court's use of doctrine from prior picketing cases in Thornhill was noted by Professor Ludwig Teller in 1942.88 Teller argued that the Thornhill Court still "recognized the traditional conception of picketing" as an activity protected only when it possesses "legal justification."' ' 9 Hence, Teller suggested that the Court in Thornhill had preserved the doctrine of lawful means and ends in deciding whether picketing should be protected. He argued, however, that the link between the Court's lawful justification analysis and its free speech doctrine was "obscure" in the opinion. 190 Teller might have missed the connection between the Court's free speech overbreadth doctrine and means and ends analysis because he did not recognize that free speech overbreadth analysis had been predicated on analysis of means and ends in the closely analogous case of Reno and in earlier equity opinions.
Teller may also have missed the connection because the Court in Thornhill did not cite Reno and failed to cite many prior equity cases to support its free speech overbreadth approach. 9 ' In the segment of the opinion that closely resembled the analysis of the Reno decision, the Court did not cite Reno or any other case.' 92 This failure to cite likely stemmed from the Supreme Court's reluctance in that era to rely on lower court opinions, a reluctance evidenced by the fact that the Court relied exclusively on Supreme Court precedent in the Thornhill opinion.' 93 The one labor injunction case at equity that the Court cited was its own 1921 decision in Tri-City, 94 in which it upheld parts of a decree that were, in the words of the Thornhill Court, "narrowly drawn to cover the precise situation."' 95 Thus, the Court cited the Tri-City equity decision for the proposition that only a narrowly drawn prohibition of picketing could withstand free speech scrutiny.
Even though the Court in Thornhill did not cite many cases at equity to support its analysis, the injunction cases formed the doctrinal backbone of the Supreme Court briefs of both the petitioner and the respondent. The respondent's brief emphasized the centrality of injunction cases, stating that the 
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The Yale Law Journal largest body of relevant precedents "are found in the multitudinous injunction proceedings."' 9 6 The petitioner similarly relied on a series of past equity cases involving picketing, including the free speech and equity discussion in Ex parte Lyons. 19 7 Thus, labor injunction cases, including those that had synthesized means and ends analysis with free speech principles, constituted the vast majority of supporting authority in both briefs. The respondent also specifically argued that the Alabama statute did not violate the restrictive doctrines of equity, stating that the statute was "definitely qualified" rather than sweeping and crystallized the "best considered opinions of the best courts [of equity]."' 98 The respondent proceeded to canvass a series of equity decisions that applied the analysis of "legitimate" or "justifiable" means and ends, including cases such as Tri-City and Plant v. Woods.' 99 Significantly, the respondent linked means and ends analysis to free speech, arguing that the free speech guarantee should not protect picketing with unlawful means or ends and asserting that petitioner's picketing had unlawful means and ends. 2 00
The briefs, contemporary commentary, and the language of the opinion all point to the direct doctrinal connection between Thornhill and prior picketing jurisprudence at equity. An important question arises, however, as to why, besides fidelity to precedent, the Court followed the overbreadth approach of picketing cases at equity in Thornhill. One explanation is that the Court wanted to protect a range of means and ends of picketing as legitimate while still upholding the power of the state to "set the limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatants, '2 ' which had also been a goal of prior equity courts. The Court in Thornhill showed reluctance to declare unequivocally that picketing was in all instances a protected exercise of free speech. The overbreadth approach allowed the Thornhill Court, like courts of equity, to protect a range of means and ends as legitimate while still permitting more precise regulation of picketing tactics deemed coercive or threatening. The overbreadth approach was different in the statutory context, however, because a court could not rewrite a statute to protect legitimate forms of picketing as equity courts could rewrite judicial decrees. 0 2 Instead, the Court invalidated the statute on its face, 20 3 insisting that the legislature be responsible for drafting a more precise prohibition of unlawful forms of picketing. Although the Court thus shifted responsibility to the legislature for modifying broad prohibitions to protect picketing, the practice of striking a balance between protecting freedom and permitting regulation remained.
The Court's desire to strike this balance may have stemmed in part from the influence of Justice Murphy, the author of Thornhill. A former Governor of Michigan, Murphy had long been associated with the labor movement 2 4 and had urged the state legislature to pass a statute protecting picketing. Yet he had also been willing to place some restrictions on picketing. 2 5 In a note to Justice Huddleson, Justice Murphy explained that "'our job as I see it... is to write a reversal without serious prejudice to the police power of the state which I believe [it] is imperative to safeguard without unduly curtailing the right of free expression. ' 
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Justice Murphy's desire to strike such a balance had roots in the approach that had long been used to regulate picketing at equity. In a memo to Justice Huddleson, Murphy expounded, "'We don't want to end picketing.., but what about its abuse? We want above all to preserve the freedoms but what about using them as a cloak for activities that are properly unlawful?' 20 7 Murphy thus expressed the objective of protecting picketing under the free speech guarantee while allowing the state to regulate picketing that was "unlawful." Murphy's discussion of the case reflected the connections between the "lawful justification" approach at equity and the overbreadth analysis adopted in Thornhill.
D. Equity and the Overbreadth Standing Exception in Thornhill
The Court's adoption in Thornhill of the overbreadth approach from equity was not confined to the use of means and ends language and the striking of a balance between protecting freedom and allowing regulation. Another important element, indeed a crucial element for modern free speech doctrine, 0 ' was that the Thornhill Court allowed the defendant to challenge the potential breadth of the statute regardless of whether his own conduct was 204. Frank Murphy was renowned for his role in facilitating the success of the famous Flint Sit-Down Strike of 1936-37, in which the United Automobile Workers Union became firmly established. According to Sidney Fine, Murphy "delayed the enforcement of a court order that could have broken the strike" and "sent the National Guard into Flint not to break the strike but to preserve the public peace and, in effect, to protect the strikers from possible attack." SIDNEY FINE, SIT-DOwN: THE GENERAL MOTORS STRIKE OF privileged. 20 9 The Court held that "[p]roof of an abuse of power in the particular case" was not "a requisite for attack on the constitutionality" of a statute that regulates free speech. 1 0 This aspect of the Thornhill opinion has come to be known as the overbreadth exception to the conventional constitutional standing rule 21 ' that a party may only seek to vindicate her own rights. 212 This overbreadth exception is one of Thornhill's most significant innovations in free speech jurisprudence. 213 By permitting a defendant to challenge a picketing statute regardless of whether his own conduct was proscribable, the Court in Thornhill followed the practice at equity that allowed defendants who had committed enjoinable acts to challenge the potential breadth of an injunction against labor activity. As in the Reno opinion, as well as earlier injunction cases, the Thornhill Court held that the facts of the case before it should not preclude the defendant from challenging the prohibition on picketing. 214 Like some of the decisions at equity, 2 5 the Court's decision in Thornhill was based on a concern for the prospective deterrent effect that a broad prohibition could have on the legitimate exercise of rights. The Court explained that an overly broad statute could be challenged even by a party whose conduct might be unprotected because such a prohibition "results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its purview. ' '2 1 6 In light of the Thornhill case's strong doctrinal links to prior picketing cases at equity, it is likely that the Court was influenced by the equity approach in establishing the free speech overbreadth exception to the constitutional standing rule.
It is important to note, however, that in creating the overbreadth exception the court cited its prior free speech decisions in the 1930s cases involving "licensing" or "censorship." In the cases of Lovell v. Griffin, 2 17 Hague v. CIO, 2 "' and Schneider v. State, 2 19 the Court had struck down municipal ordinances that required licenses or permits for distributing literature or holding public meetings. Relying on a "standardless licensing" doctrine, the Court had invalidated the ordinances on their face on the ground that licensing speech without clear standards posed an unacceptable risk of the arbitrary suppression of free expression. 2 20 These decisions supported the Thornhill holding to the extent that the Court invalidated the statutes on their face. These decisions did not, however, indicate that a defendant whose own conduct was not privileged could challenge such statutes. As the Supreme Court has since noted in City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 221 these licensing cases "did not involve any departure from the general rule that a litigant only has standing to vindicate his own constitutional rights. 222 The Court in Taxpayers for Vincent explained that, under the licensing statutes considered in those cases, "any enforcement carries with it the risk that the enforcement is being used merely to suppress speech, since the statute is not aimed at a substantive evil within the power of the government to prohibit." 2 23 Thus, the licensing statutes were unconstitutional as applied to the defendant's conduct as well as in every other application because "any attempt to enforce such legislation would create an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas." 224 Hence, the Court in the licensing cases invalidated the ordinances on their face under the rationale that the statutes "could never be applied in a valid manner" because they allowed for standardless prior licensing of speech. 22 According to the Court in Taxpayers for Vincent, the statute in Thornhill was held facially invalid, in contrast, because "the very existence of some broadly written statutes may have such a deterrent effect on free expression that they should be subject to challenge even by a party whose own conduct may be unprotected. ' 2 26 The Court invalidated the statute on its face not because it could never be applied in a valid manner but rather because the very existence of the broad prohibition threatened, or in modern terms, "chilled," 7 the legitimate exercise of free speech rights. Thus, the Court permitted the defendant to challenge the statute on its face on the ground that it imposed a "pervasive restraint '228 on freedom of discussion rather than on the ground that it could never be applied constitutionally. Viewed against the backdrop of picketing cases at equity, the Court's "pervasive restraint" concern likely originated in the practice of the courts -of equity rather than in the licensing cases.
Even though the Court's "pervasive restraint" analysis did not originate in the licensing cases, the Court artfully integrated the rationale of those cases 220 into the Thornhill opinion. The Court referred to the "arbitrary suppression" rationale of the licensing cases as a reason why an overly broad statute constituted a pervasive restraint on free speech. 22 9 Although the Court in the licensing cases had discussed "arbitrary enforcement" in light of the potential for misapplication in particular cases, the Thornhill Court pointed to the possibility of arbitrary enforcement as a justification for the notion that overbroad statutes pose a general and continuous threat to free speech. In this manner, Justice Murphy, writing for the Court, deftly subsumed the rationale of the licensing cases under the rubric of his analysis, derived from equity, that a broad prohibition acts as a constant deterrent to the prospective exercise of speech rights. Hence, Justice Murphy was able to forge a link between the traditional concerns of labor cases at equity and the Supreme Court's major free speech precedents.
Justice Murphy likely situated the Thomnhill opinion in line with the Supreme Court's major free speech precedents in order to solidify the gains labor had made. By drawing analogies to the Court's prior free speech opinions, Murphy sought to constitutionalize the doctrine that had emerged at equity in order to ensure that it would be faithfully applied. Whereas equity doctrines were discretionary in nature, the Court's pronouncements on the Constitution were binding. In addition, Justice Murphy likely was trying to increase the prestige of labor's rights by cloaking in constitutional splendor the doctrinal approach that had emerged from the thorny history at equity.
Justice Murphy emphasized the significance of his Thornhill opinion by writing "'labor's magna carta' at the top of a printed copy.2 3 0 This was the same designation that labor supporters had optimistically bestowed on the Clayton Act twenty-six years before. But where the Clayton Act had failed to protect labor's right to picket and organize, Justice Murphy sought to succeed under the First Amendment. Under the Constitution he sought to bring to fruition labor's long battle to secure protections for picketing that had begun with the best courts of equity and had continued through the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, culminating in Thornhill.
Im. CONCLUSION
The history of the overbreadth doctrine is a tale of the gradual transformation of a body of law from an oppressive force into an emancipatory 229. Id. at 97-98. Although the Court explicitly relied on the licensing cases for the arbitraryenforcement rationale, it is important to note that courts of equity had offered a similar rationale for holding that injunctions were "too broad." See, e.g., International Pocket Book Workers v. Orlove, 148 A. 826, 831 (Md. 1930); see also discussion supra Section I.C.
230. 3 FINE, supra note 147, at 177. one. 23 " ' We may attribute this transformation partly to labor's persistent political struggles and the resulting changes in social attitudes toward unions. We may also attribute the transformation to the capacity of legal doctrines to adapt to divergent purposes. 2 The flexibility of legal doctrines enabled courts to use an overbreadth form of analysis that had provided modest protection in early cases to establish significant protection for picketing in Thornhill. The "adaptability" of legal doctrine also enabled courts to use the traditional principles of equity to advance progressive purposes. Originally conceived to place limits on courts' ability to provide individualized justice according to the judicial sense of conscience, 1 3 the restrictive doctrines of equity were eventually placed in the service of social justice according to popular sentiment. Thus, as a result of the flexibility of legal forms, courts were able to use the ancient doctrines of equity to forge a bold new free speech doctrine. 
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